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I. INTRODUCTION
The Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) is the Sovereign Wealth
Fund (SWF) of the state of Libya and is the biggest African SWF. 1
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The Gaddafi regime established the LIA in 2006 to streamline the
management of Libya's excess oil revenues and foreign reserves and
to better integrate Libya into international markets.2 The purpose of
the LIA is enshrined in Libyan law:
The [LIA's objectives] shall be investment of Libyan Funds / Monies
abroad in the various financial and economic fields, on sound economic
basis, as would contribute to development of the national economic
resources and diversification thereof for achieving the best financial
revenues for supporting the Public Treasury resources, and minimizing
income fluctuations and other revenues of the State.
3
The LIA forms part of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth
Funds (IFSWF),4 a group of SWFs whose members endorse the
Santiago Principles. The Santiago Principles are a series of guiding
principles issued in 2008 as a result of complex multilevel negotiations
grateful to Panagiotis Delimatsis and Ioannis Stribis for their comments on an
abridged version of this article presented at the 7th Conference of the Postgraduate
and Early Professionals/Academics Network of the Society of International
Economic Law (PEPA/SIEL), held at the European University Cyprus in Nicosia on
13-14 April 2018.
1. Different sources estimate the valuation of the assets managed by the LIA to
be between USD 60 and 70 billion. See, e.g., Libyan Investment Authority,
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS INST., https://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/libyan-
investment-authority/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2018); Sami Zaptia, UN Libya Experts
Panel Seeking to Establish the True Value ofLibya's Frozen Assets, LIBYA HERALD
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.libyaherald.com/2018/03/13/un-libya-experts-panel-
seeking-to-establish-the-true-value-of-libyas-frozen-assets/; Matthew Campbell &
Kit Chellel, Hot Mess: How Goldman Sachs Lost $1.2 Billion of Libya's
Money, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/
features/2016-goldman-sachs-libya/ (contrasting with other sources that claim that,
after more than seven years of the asset freeze, the value of assets currently managed
by the LIA is as low as USD 34 billion).
2. See Julien Chaisse et al., Emerging Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Making:
Assessing the Economic Feasibility and Regulatory Strategies, 45 J. WORLD TRADE
837, 842 (2011); Int'l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds [IWG], Generally
Accepted Principles and Practices: "Santiago Principles" (Oct. 2008),
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/iwgsantiagoprinciplesoct2008_en.pdf
[hereinafter Santiago Principles].
3. Libyan Inv. Auth. v. Goldman Sachs Int'l [2016] EWHC (Ch) 2530, [13]
(Eng.) (emphasis added) (quoting General People's Committee, No (125) of 1375
PD (2007 A.D.)).
4. See Our Members, IFSWF, http://www.ifswf.org/our-members (last visited
Sept. 8, 2018); see generally Santiago Principles, supra note 2.
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involving the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in collaboration
with other supranational bodies, a significant number of SWFs, and
investment-recipient States.' The aim of the Santiago Principles is to
help SWFs improve their governance and enhance their transparency
standards and, in this way, to sustain open flows of capital.6
During the Arab Spring, Libya experienced a popular uprising,
fueled in part by a "lingering resentment" against Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi's regime.' In 2011, implementing United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1970 and 1973, several
Western countries froze, among other financial resources, the assets
of the LIA.8 This was the first time assets of a SWF were the target of
a UNSC asset freeze.9 The resolutions aimed to prevent Gaddafi from
using the resources of government entities as a source of funding for
his regime, which was soon engaged in a bloody civil war with rebel
forces.'" Muammar Gaddafi's death in October 2011 led to the
downfall of his regime. However, some of the LIA's assets remained
(and still remain) frozen." The UNSC has noted that the frozen assets
will be made available to, and for the benefit of, the Libyan people "as
5. Santiago Principles, supra note 2, at 1-2.
6. See generally EDWIN M. TRUMAN, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THREAT OR
SALVATION? (2010) (analyzing the role of various sovereign wealth funds in the
global economy).
7. See DIRK VANDEWALLE, A HISTORY OF MODERN LIBYA 204 (2d ed. 2012)
(discussing the regime's ability to suppress opposition over the four decades
preceding the revolution).
8. See S.C. Res. 1973, 19-21 (Mar. 17, 2011); see also S.C. Res. 1970,
17-21 (Feb. 26, 2011); David Cutler, Factbox -Sanctions against Libya, REUTERS
(Mar. 14, 2011, 10:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/idlNIndia-555684
20110314.
9. See Mariya Gordeyeva & Olzhas Auyezov, BNY Mellon Freezes $22.6
Billion in Kazakh Oil Fund Assets, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2017, 12:47 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-bny-mellon-lawsuit/bny-mellon-
freezes-22-6-billion-in-kazakh-oil-fund-assets-idUSKBN1EFOF2 ("The freezing of
the assets comes weeks after President Nazarbayev threatened to sack his cabinet if
they failed to make large state companies bring back cash held abroad.").
10. See VANDEWALLE, supra note 7, at 204 (stating that the United Nations and
Europe targeted Gaddafi and his family with a number of sanctions as the war
spread).
11. See Giulia Paravicini, Millions Flow from Gaddafi's 'Frozen Funds' to
Unknown Beneficiaries, POLITICO (Feb. 8,2018,4:02 AM), https://www.politico.eu/
article/muammar-gaddafi-frozen-funds-belgium-unknown-beneficiaries/.
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soon as practical.' 1 2 The LIA's management claims that because the
assets remain frozen, the fund has experienced notable losses, instead
of what would have been returns on its investments if its assets had
been properly invested. 3
This article examines a set of issues related to the LIA's activities
and governance, with a particular focus on the impact of the UNSC
sanctions. The article questions whether it is justifiable to perpetuate
the sanctions on the LIA's assets to the detriment of the fund's
activities and the people of Libya, for whose benefit the LIA was first
established. The article makes four critical points. First, the article
highlights that the LIA remains subject to U.N. sanctions, seven years
after Gaddafi's death, which have had negative effects on the LIA's
governance. 4 Second, the article questions the continued validity of
the reasons provided by the U.N. Sanctions Committee for the LIA's
continued listing. To make this assertion, the article notes that the asset
freezing measures against the LIA were ordered so the resources of
the LIA could be not used as a source of funding for the Gaddafi family
to finance the perpetuation of his regime. The article proposes that,
following Gaddafi's loss of power, the basis for the sanctions was no
longer sustainable and should have been revisited by the UNSC to
avoid measures aimed at advancing the interests of the Libyan people
from having the opposite effect. Third, the article demonstrates that
the partial sanctions relief ordered by the UNSC had limited impact
12. See S.C. Res. 2040, 9 (Mar. 12, 2012) ("[T]he Committee shall, in
consultation with the Libyan authorities, lift the designation of these entities as soon
as practical to ensure the assets are made available to and for the benefit of the people
of Libya.").
13. Ibrahim 0. A. Dabbashi, Letter dated 21 Mar. 2016 from the Permanent Rep.
of Libya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2016/275 (Mar. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Dabbashi] ("The LIA estimates
that in 2014 alone, instead of increasing the value of its assets base, it had real losses
of $721 million. Furthermore, it lost an additional $1.6 billion to $2.3 billion in what
would have been returns on investment if its assets had been properly invested .... ).
14. The LIA is the first SWF to have been explicitly listed by the UNSC, i.e. the
first such entity to have had its economic resources frozen as a result of being named
on a UNSC sanctions list. In contrast, for example, the Kuwait Investment Authority,
the SWF of the State of Kuwait, was impacted by sanctions imposed by the UNSC
against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s, but was not "listed"
per se. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 661, (Aug. 6, 1990) (providing for sanctions and other
measures intended to help restore the legitimate government of Kuwait).
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on the LIA's governance. Fourth, the article examines the LIA's
governance structure, investment strategy, and the Santiago Principles
to provide explanations as to why the fund remains subject to U.N.
sanctions while other entities have been removed from the Sanctions
List. An analysis of the LIA's governance structure is essential to
clarifying the reasons behind the continued application of the
sanctions, and to addressing the effects of the asset freezing measures
on the LIA's investment strategy and governance. An examination of
the Santiago Principles and the potential consequences of their
application to the current governance of the Libyan SWF, leads us to
conclude that to improve the governance, transparency, and risk
management of the LIA further adherence to the Santiago Principles
is necessary.
To support our thesis that the UNSC's reasons for the continued
listing of the LIA are obsolete, and that demonstrable improvements
in governance-proven in part through a recommitment to the
Santiago Principles and the IFSWF-will signal the LIA has the
capacity to re-assume management of its assets, the article is divided
into four parts. While Section I provided a brief overview of the article
and its context, Section II discusses the evolving asset freezing
measures adopted by the UNSC Sanctions Committee with respect to
Libya. Section III critically assesses the LIA, scrutinizing its
investment strategy and compliance with international standards. This
section also highlights the LIA's disputed management and
leadership, focusing on the political struggles that still divide the state
at the time of writing. Section IV analyzes the perpetuation of asset
freezing measures following the death of Gaddafi, despite the arrest or
death of a number of members of his family and his former regime.
Section IV of the article summarizes and highlights the critical points
raised herein.
II. THE ASSET FREEZE
In this section we discuss the political situation in Libya in 2011,
which the UNSC determined to represent a threat to international
peace and security, and which led the UNSC to request that states
freeze Libyan assets so as to prevent the Gaddafi family from using
them to prolong the civil war. The first set of UNSC sanctions against
the LIA, which ordered states to freeze the fund's assets, were adopted
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in March 2011. In September 2011, these sanctions were partially
relaxed. We analyze this process in detail in the following section.
A. THE INITIAL LISTING
The Libyan uprising started in February 2011 in the eastern city of
Benghazi, triggered by protests against the Libyan security forces'
arrest of Fathi Tarbil, a human rights lawyer and critic of the Gaddafi
regime. 5 The local demonstrations quickly turned into fighting that
spread across Libya's northern coast, 6 with reports of hundreds of
deaths and injuries as rebels clashed with pro-government forces in
Benghazi while attempting to take control of Libya's second most
populous city.' The UNSC initially expressed regret at the violence
and civilian deaths in a press statement, 8 and then, on February 26,
2011, it reacted unanimously in adopting Resolution 1970.19
Paragraph 17 of the Resolution provides:
[A]il Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial
assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities
listed in Annex II of this resolution or designated by the Committee
established pursuant to paragraph 24 below, or by individuals or entities
acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled
by them, and decides further that all Member States shall ensure that any
funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being
made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within
their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities listed in
15. See VANDEWALLE, supra note 7, at 204 (explaining that these protests
quickly spread through the economically neglected eastern part of the nation).
16. Id.
17. See Martin Chulov, Libyan City Dubbed 'Free Benghazi' as Anti-Gaddafi
Troops Take Control, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2011, 9:08 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/20 11/feb/23/libya-free-benghazi-anti-gaddafi-
troops (detailing the weapons and tactics used by the regime to remain in control of
the city).
18. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Libya,
U.N. Press Release SC/10180-AFRI2120 (Feb. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Press Release,
Security Council Press Statement on Libya] (calling for an immediate end to the
violence).
19. See generally S.C. Res. 1970, (Feb. 26, 2011).
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Annex II of this resolution or individuals designated by the
Committee .... 20
The UNSC listed six individuals in Annex II of Resolution 1970:
the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi2 1 and five of his children. 22 No
entities were listed in this Resolution. However, following an
escalation of hostilities in Libya, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973
on March 17, 2011,23 which extended the asset freeze measures in
Resolution 1970.24 In addition to the individuals designated as subject
to asset freeze measures, 25 the LIA was one of five entities the UNSC
listed in Annex II of Resolution 1973 as subject to measures imposed
by Resolution 1970.26 According to the UNSC, the justification for
freezing the LIA's assets was that the Libyan SWF was "[u]nder [the]
control of Muammar Gaddafi and his family, and [a] potential source
of funding for his regime."2 Notably, in paragraph 20 of Resolution
1973, the UNSC also affirmed "its determination to ensure that assets
frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of Resolution 1970 (2011) shall, at a
later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit
of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. ' '28
UNSC resolutions calling upon States to freeze assets are, of course,
not self-executing and require implementation by States.29 In this
20. Id. 17.
21. Gaddafi's positions of responsibility, according to UNSC Res. 1970,
included "Leader of the Revolution" and "Supreme Commander of Armed Forces."
Id. at Annex II.
22. Id.
23. S.C. Res. 1973, (Mar. 17, 2011).
24. Id. 19.
25. See id. at Annex II.
26. See id. 22 ("Decides ... that the individuals and entities listed in Annex II
shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in ... resolution 1970 (2011)"). The
other four entities listed in the Annex were the Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan
Foreign Bank, the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio, and the Libyan National Oil
Corporation. See id at Annex II.
27. Id. at Annex II.
28. Id. 20.
29. See, e.g., Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Implementing Sanctions Resolutions in
Domestic Law, in NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 33, 35 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004) (asserting that
although such UNSC resolutions are not self-executing, States are not exempt from
their implementation by invoking domestic law).
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sense, implementation can take place at the domestic and/or
supranational levels. Following the adoption of Resolution 1970, the
Council of the European Union adopted Regulation No. 204/2011 on
March 2, 2011,30 which provides for measures to implement
Resolution 1970 in the E.U. legal order." The United Kingdom also
took measures to implement Resolution 1970 by way of an Order in
Council, The Libya (Financial Sanctions) Order 2011.32
Unfortunately, it is difficult to precisely quantify the assets frozen by
States pursuant to the sanctions.3 This is due to a lack of transparency
on the part of the LIA and its subsidiaries on the one hand and, on the
other hand, the fragmentation and lack of transparency that
characterize the execution of asset freezing proceedings. 4
B. THE PARTIAL EASING
In September 2011, the UNSC revisited the asset freeze measures
imposed upon several Libyan entities, removing two organizations-
30. Council Regulation 204/2011 of Mar. 2, 2011, Concerning Restrictive
Measures in View of the Situation in Libya, 2011 O.J. (L 58) 1 (EU) (following a
series of amendments, Regulation 204/2011 was repealed and replaced by Council
Regulation 2016/44 of 18 Jan. 2016, Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of
the Situation in Libya).
31. Regulation 204/2011 was adopted in accordance with Council Decision
2011/137/CFSP of 28 Feb. 2011, Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of the
Situation in Libya. See Council Regulation 204/2011, supra note 30; Council
Decision 2011/137/CFSP of Feb. 28, 2011, Concerning Restrictive Measures in
View of the Situation in Libya, 2011 O.J. (L 58) 53 (EU).
32. The Libya (Financial Sanctions) Order 2011, SI 2011/548 (U.K.).
33. There are no precise assessments of the amount of LIA assets that have been
frozen as a result of the UN sanctions, but it has been claimed (for example by
Mohsen Derregia, who was Chairman and CEO of the LIA for 11 months from April
2012) that the figure could include 95% of the assets under the LIA's management.
See Chris Wright, The Battle for the Libyan Investment Authority, EUROMONEY
(Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b 12kjxb3318zry/the-battle-
for-the-libyan-investment-authority [hereinafter Wright, The Battle for the Libyan
Investment Authority] (noting that $20 billion dollars of assets are subject to
attachment orders).
34. See Marina Mancini, UN Sanctions Targeting Individuals and the ICC
Proceedings: How to Achieve a Mutually Reinforcing Interaction, in COERCIVE
DIPLOMACY, SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 228, 242-44 (Natalino Ronzitti
ed., 2016) ("Generally, however, the amount and location of property and assets
frozen pursuant to a Security Council Resolution or in execution of an ICC request
are strictly confidential.").
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the Libyan National Oil Corporation and the Zueitina Oil Company-
from the list. 5 However, with respect to the LIA, Resolution 2009
(from 2011) modified the asset freeze measures, deciding: (1) that all
assets (i.e. "funds, other financial assets and economic resources")3 6
frozen outside Libya as of the date of the resolution would remain
frozen;3 (2) that the LIA "shall no longer be subject to the measures
imposed in paragraphs (sic.) 17 of resolution 1970 (2011)";38 and (3)
that the LIA funds frozen by U.N. Member States could be accessed,
for one (or more) of the following purposes:
(i) humanitarian needs;
(ii) fuel, electricity, and water for strictly civilian uses;
(iii) resuming Libyan production and sale of hydrocarbons;
(iv) establishing, operating, or strengthening civilian government
institutions and civilian public infrastructure; or
(v) facilitating the resumption of banking sector operations, including
supporting or facilitating international trade with Libya .... 39
In other words, U.N. Member States are "no longer required to
ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are
prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any
individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of
[the LIA]." 40 However, assets frozen outside Libya prior to Resolution
2009 (from 2011) are to remain frozen subject to the foregoing
exceptions.4 ' As will be demonstrated below, these limited
adjustments have failed to ease pressure on the LIA and its operations.
Libyan officials have sought relief at the U.N. level for some of the
restrictions the asset freeze placed upon its SWF. Most prominently,
35. See S.C. Res. 2009, 14 (Sept. 16, 2011).
36. Id. 15(a).
37. Id.
38. Id. 15(b).
39. Id. 16.
40. Id. 15(b).
41. S.C. Res. 2009 15 (lifting certain restrictions imposed on designated
Libyan financial institutions).
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on March 21, 2016, the then Libyan Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, Ibrahim Dabbashi, sent a letter to the President of the
UNSC, petitioning the UNSC to amend Resolutions 1970, 1973, and
2009 "to explicitly allow the LIA to engage in fund management
within the frozen accounts to prevent the further dissipation of LIA
assets. 42 According to the letter:
The LIA estimates that in 2014 alone, instead of increasing the value of its
assets base, it had real losses of $721 million. Furthermore, it lost an
additional $1.6 billion to $2.3 billion in what would have been returns on
investment if its assets had been properly invested in conservative
investments with competitive interest rates.
43
Mr. Dabbashi therefore requested that the UNSC take urgent action
on behalf of the Libyan people to adapt the sanctions regime to
"protect the value of the LIA assets. ' 44 However, at the time of this
writing, the LIA remains on the list of entities and other groups subject
to asset freeze measures pursuant to Resolution 1970.4' The reasons
that the LIA remains on the list reflect the reasons provided for its
initial listing in Resolution 1973.46 The LIA also remains subject to
sanctions by the European Union4 and the United Kingdom.48 Indeed,
the status quo prevails despite the fact that, in Resolution 2278 of
2016, the UNSC:
42. Dabbashi, supra note 13, at 1.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2.
45. See U.N. Libya Sanctions Comm., The List Established and Maintained
Pursuant to Security Council Res. 1970 (2011), at 5, https://scsanctions.un.org/
fop/ fop?xml-htdocs/resources/xml/enlconsolidated.xml&xslt-htdocs/resources/xsl
/en/libya-r.xsl (last visited Oct. 28, 2018) [hereinafter Sanctions List].
46. See Libyan Investment Authority, UN (Oct. 29, 2014)
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1970/materials/summaries/entity/libyan
-investment-authority (reasoning that the fund is "[u]nder control of Muammar
Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime").
47. See Council Implementing Regulation 2017/489 of Mar. 21, 2017,
Implementing Article 21(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/44 Concerning Restrictive
Measures in View of the Situation in Libya, 2017 O.J. (L76) 3, Annex VI (EU).
48. See Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK, GOV.UK
(Mar. 17, 2011), https://www.gov.uk/governmentluploads/system/uploads/
attachment data/file/602635/libya.pdf.
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Reaffirm[ed] its intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph
17 of resolution 1970 (from 2011) shall at a later stage be made available
to and for the benefit of the Libyan people and taking note of the [March
21, 2016 Letter] ... affirm[ed] the Security Council's readiness to consider
changes, when appropriate, to the asset freeze at the request of the
Government of National Accord....
As to the effects of the partial easing at the domestic level, in July
2012 the Italian Court of Appeal in Rome, in response to a request
from the LIA, decided to unfreeze LIA assets seized pursuant to a
cooperation request from the International Criminal Court.5 0 The U.K.
Court of Appeal has also interpreted the partial easing of U.N.
sanctions in favor of the LIA. In Libyan Investment Authority v.
Maud,5 the Court of Appeal held that, according to Moore-Bick LJ,
"the payment of debts arising under obligations which came into
existence before sanctions were imposed is to be regarded as...
making new funds available rather than dealing with existing assets. 52
However, despite these developments, as will be demonstrated in
Section IV below, the partial relaxation of U.N. sanctions has failed to
improve the LIA's ability to manage and improve returns on these
assets and consequently, its ability to better manage risk.53 As
mentioned, a large part of the fund's assets still remain frozen pursuant
to its initial listing. 4 Before turning to this issue, the article will first
examine the LIA in greater detail to demonstrate that, in addition to
the sanctions, fragmented and politically-motivated governance has
contributed to the decrease in value of the LIA assets.
49. S.C. Res. 2278, 11 (Mar. 31, 2016).
50. See Corte di Appello di Roma (Rome Court of Appeal), Sezione Quarta
Penale, N4/12 R.G.I.E. 23.7.2012 (on file with author); see also Mancini, supra note
34, at 242.
51. See generally Libyan Inv. Auth. v. Maud [2016] EWCA (Civ) 788 (Eng.)
(finding no grounds for setting aside the statutory demand and holding that appeal
should be permitted).
52. Id. [19].
53. See generally Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Collective Security and the
Economic Interventionism of the UN-The Need for a Coherent and Integrated
Approach, 10 J. INT'L EcON. L. 51, 58 (2007) (detailing various instances of frozen
national assets and the "side effects" on the civilian population).
54. See Paravicini, supra note 11.
397
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III. THE TROUBLED LIFE OF THE LIA
This section provides an overview of the LIA from its establishment
to the problems it currently faces. Initially, this article analyzes the
fund's inception and how it functions. Subsequently, the article turns
to the Santiago Principles (Principles), the commitments contained
therein, and LIA's adoption of the Principles. In the last part of this
section, the article examines the struggle for leadership and control of
the LIA, and it sheds light on the complex governance of the fund,
which reflects clear political divisions.
A. THE LIA's INCEPTION, STRUCTURE, AND INVESTMENT
STRATEGY
The LIA was established in 2006 to improve the management of
Libyan Foreign Exchange (ForEx) reserves deriving from the sale of
oil5 and to integrate Libya into international financial markets. 6 The
decision to establish the LIA was taken in 2003 and 2004, after the
UNSC and the United States lifted the sanctions imposed against
Libya in response to the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland, and the Union de transports adriens Flight 772
over Niger.5
55. For an analysis of the macroeconomic and legal background for the
establishment of a SWF, see Chaisse et al., supra note 2, at 842 (estimating assets
under the Libyan Investment Authority from 2007-2010 to be worth $70 billion due
to oil revenue).
56. The IMF assisted with and supported the establishment of the LIA and
advised the Libyan Government during and after the establishment of the SWF. See
IMF, The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Selected Issue-Medium-
Term Economic Reform Strategy, and Statistical Appendix, at 22, IMF Country
Report No. 06/137 (Apr. 2006) (recommending that Libya establish a "Stabilization
and Savings Fund"). In subsequent IMF Country Reports, the IMF team offered
suggestions on how to improve the governance of the funds until 2013 when the IMF
Art. IV Consultations were interrupted. See e.g., IMF, Libya 2013 Article IV
Consultation, at 4, IMF Country Report No. 13/150 (May 2013) (offering
suggestions on how to improve the governance of the funds).
57. See S.C. Res. 1506, 1 (Sept. 12, 2003); Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Lifts Sanctions Imposed on Libya After Terrorist Bombings of Pan
Am 103, UTA 772, U.N. Press Release SC/7868 (Sept. 12, 2003) [hereinafter
Security Council Lifts Sanctions Imposed on Libya After Terrorist Bombings of Pan
Am 103, UTA 772]. It is important to note that in the mid-2000s, as a result of the
increase in oil prices, many oil-producing States in Africa, the Arabian Peninsula,
and Asia established SWFs in order to better manage and diversify oil revenues.
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Although Libya's integration into international financial markets is
a logical and popularly accepted reason for the establishment of LIA,58
it is only partially true. Libya was already active in international
financial markets despite the application of international sanctions.
The Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO), one of the
subsidiaries of the LIA, held almost $6 billion in assets in European
companies as early as 2000.' 9 One of the objectives of LAFICO was
to invest in Western markets in such a way as to circumvent loosely
regulated international sanctions through "financial engineering
operations. 60 In this way the number of entities, subsidiaries, and shell
companies owned by LAFICO quickly increased and their operations
grew by participating in investment operations related to the
privatization of European companies in the 1990S. 6 1
The LIA's mandate was to be "a world-class provider of investment
management for the benefit of the Libyan state and the long-term
future and well-being of its citizens. ' 62 To achieve this mandate, the
LIA was equipped with foreign cash reserves and incorporated as
subsidiaries pre-existing entities that had been active in international
markets before the UNSC and the US lifted sanctions against Libya in
2003 and 2004.63 These subsidiaries include LAFICO, the Libyan
58. See Libyan Inv. Auth. v. Goldman Sachs Int'l [2016] EWHC (Ch) 2530, [1]
(Eng.) (noting that the LIA was established for the purpose of investing money for
the benefit of Libya's present and future citizens).
59. See Vernon Silver, Qaddafi's Money Manager, GLOB. POLICY FORUM (Oct.
25, 2001), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/195/42361 .html
(recognizing that many European countries welcomed Libyan investments despite
that the UN sanctions ordered that Libyan assets be frozen).
60. In the interview with Bloomberg's Vernon Silver, Mohamed Ali El Huwej,
Chairman of LAFICO and the Libyan Consulting Board for Foreign Investment at
the time of the interview, explained the investment strategy: "minority stakes, shell
companies and interlocking share holdings -- that won't attract the attention of US
authorities." (emphasis added). Id. Moreover, many European countries accepted
Libyan investments. In this way, in the early 2000s, Libyan state-controlled entities
had more than US $8 billion worth of assets in foreign countries. Id.
61. Id.
62. Santiago Principles, supra note 2, at 39 (emphasis added).
63. See Security Council Lifts Sanctions Imposed on Libya After Terrorist
Bombings of Pan Am 103, UTA 772, supra note 57; Silver, supra note 59 ("[T]he
country has a total portfolio of $8 billion.., including 5 percent of Banca di Roma
SpA, Italy's fourth-largest bank; $1 billion in U.K. real estate; and stakes in 72
companies in more than 45 countries, many of which do business in the U.S.").
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African Investment Company (LAICO), the Libyan African
Investment Portfolio (LAP),64 the Long-Term Investment Portfolio
(LTP), and the Libyan Local Investment and Development Fund
(LLIDF).65 These subsidiaries were managed by people in the inner
circle of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and retained a high
degree of autonomy in their investment strategies.66
Soon after its establishment, the LIA was under governmental
pressure to invest in international markets. 61 Immediately after the
establishment of the fund, the LIA team led by Mohammed H. Layas
started to work to build a credible governance and operational
structure.68 To this end, the LIA pledged to adopt international
standards, inviting external private auditors and advisors to assist in
the process.69 The LIA started investment operations in early 2007,
64. The LAP is listed separately from the LIA on the Sanctions List due to the
particularities of its operations and its possession of large quantities of cash. Mr.
Bashir Saleh Bashir chaired the LAP during the Gaddafi era, benefiting from a high
degree of autonomy in its investment strategy, distant from the oversight of the LIA.
Supposed to hold the keys of many secrets related to LAP investments made for the
benefit of Gaddafi, he managed to evade a series of international arrest warrants and
recently survived a gun attack in Johannesburg. South Africa: Hammer- Wielding
Robbers Attack, Shoot Former Gaddafi Banker, ALL AFR. (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://allafrica.com/stories/20180302073 8.html.
65. LIBYAN ORG. OF POLICIES & STRATEGIES, GOOD GOVERNANCE OF THE
LIBYAN INVESTMENTS AND FUNDS ABROAD 7 (Nov. 2016), http://loopsresearch.org/
media/images/photopvq3j 176ir.pdf
66. See Stephanie Nebehay, Assets of Subsidiaries of Libya's Investment Arm
Freed-UN Panel, REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2012, 1:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/libya-sanctions-idAFL5E8DG4LA20120216 (recognizing the UN sanctions
regime was meant to prevent Gaddafi, his family, and his associates from using
financial assets and property in Libya and overseas to fund repression against the
Libyan people).
67. Santiago Principles, supra note 2, at 39 (quoting Executive Director of the
LIA, Mohamed H. Layas, "The Libyan Investment Authority is committed to
managing and developing the funds entrusted to it by employing the highest level of
financial expertise to invest across a range of international markets and asset
classes.").
68. See James Titcomb, How Libya Bet Billions on Prosperity - and Lost,
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 23, 2014), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/
banksandfinance/11052281/How-Libya-bet-billions-on-prosperity-and-lost.html.
69. See Chris Wright, Libyan Investment Authority: The KPMG Reports,
EUROMONEY (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.euromoney.com/article/bl2kjxb
ljc96yl/libyan-investment-authority-the-kpmg-reports (discussing KPMG's leaked
audit reports from 2010 and insight into where the LIA had invested); Santiago
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and even though the president of the fund pledged to manage and
develop the fund by employing the highest level of financial expertise
to invest across a range of international markets and asset classes,"0
this would have been hard to achieve in a short time, especially in light
of the Gaddafi regime's interference."
The assets under the management of the LIA included investments
in highly liquid instruments, conservative instruments such as treasury
bills and bonds, but also alternative investments in structured
products, private equity, and derivatives that were externally
managed. 2 The decisions that led to the use of sophisticated financial
instruments by an inexperienced fund like the LIA do not appear to
have been based on an economic analysis of the instruments."'
Conversely, these decisions derived from shady practices and took
place under unclear chains of command and external influences that
affected the judgment of the fund's managers."4 Some believe that
these investments were made with the intention to disguise the LIA's
assets and mislead international authorities in case of the application
of further international sanctions."5 From the outset, these investments
Principles, supra note 2, at 39 ("[The] LIA intends to meet high transparency
standards and a new decree in 2008 requires that LIA publish annual reports on its
website in both English and Arabic.").
70. See Santiago Principles, supra note 2, at 39 (identifying LIA's mandate to
be a world class provider of investment management for the Libyan state and its
citizens).
71. See Chris Wright, Ousted Head ofLibyan Investment Authority Speaks Out,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/b53434fd-lb03-3504-81ac-
faf4b80ce83f [hereinafter Wright, Ousted Head of Libyan Investment Authority
Speaks Out] (citing an interview with the former Chairman and CEO of the LIA,
Mohsen Derregia, who noted that the ad hoc investments and decision making by
Gaddafi and his father did not fit the profile of LIA).
72. LIBYAN ORG. OF POLICIES & STRATEGIES, supra note 65, at 1.
73. Lina Saigol & Cynthia O'Murchu, After Gaddafi: A Spent Force, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2011, 2:53 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/lb5ellb6-d4cb-lleO-a7ac-
00144feab49a (citing a report by KPMG that audited the LIA in May 2010 which
described "an institution in deep disarray and unable to manage its ambitious
investment strategy").
74. Id. ("[T]he LIA quickly became home to an opaque and often convoluted
network of investments run by a tight-knit circle including a close friend of Seif al-
Islam.").
75. This argument was also raised, albeit without success, in the case between
the LIA and Goldman Sachs. See Libyan Inv. Auth. v. Goldman Sachs Int'l [2016]
EWHC (Ch) 2530, [317], [425]-[426] (Eng.).
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
raised doubts on the part of Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
(KPMG), which audited the fund and discovered that some of the
operations were producing major losses to the SWF, as were the high
fees that the fund managers were already seeking.6 Later, additional
scrutiny of the fund's structured investment operations led to
international corruption investigations, and private disputes involving
the LIA and its managers."
The LIA and its subsidiaries have invested in a broad range of
markets mainly in Europe, the United States, and Africa.8 Although
many of these investments were made strategically so as to gain
influence in specific countries' economic sectors, and despite the
Libyan identity of the investing entities, the LIA, LAFICO, and other
subsidiaries were nevertheless allowed to invest and hold equities in
different economic sectors without facing any particular barriers from
the respective host countries." These sectors include, inter alia: the
entertainment industry,80 media,8' the automotive industry,82 the
76. Saigol & O'Murchu, supra note 73 ("The LIA lacks operational robustness
to effectively manage investments of this complexity.").
77. See, e.g., Libyan Inv. Auth., [2016] EWHC (Ch) 2530, [317], [425]-[426]
(noting the LIA's argument that Goldman Sachs unduly influenced it to enter into
the Disputed Trades and that the Disputed Trades amounted to unconscionable
bargains); Michael Stothard & Jane Croft, SocGen Agrees €963m Settlement with
Libyan Investment Authority, FIN. TIMES (May 4, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/7dc88450-3094-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a ("The French bank said on
Thursday it had signed a confidential settlement agreement with the LIA in a dispute
over $2. lbn of trades executed between 2007 and 2009, before Muammar Gaddafi
was deposed as Libya's leader.").
78. See Paravicini, supra note 11 (noting the UN Sanctions targeted the assets of
the Gaddafi regime in countries across the world).
79. Id.
80. See id. (discussing LIA's assets in in the carmaker Fiat, the soccer club
Juventus, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Pearson, the then publisher of the Financial
Times); Saigol & O'Murchu, supra note 73.
81. Pearson Plc published the Financial Times. See Paravicini, supra note 11;
Saigol & O'Murchu, supra note 73.
82. See, e.g., Saigol & O'Murchu, supra note 73; Tom Bawden, Libya's Oil
Money Has Made it Major World Shareholder, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2011),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/20 11/feb/21/libya-oil-money-maj or-world-
shareholder (explaining that the LIA had approximately 2% stake in Fiat).
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financial sector,83 telecommunications, energy,85 and heavy industry
tied to the military sector.86
The governance structure of the LIA is determined by Law No. 13,
which was implemented in 2010 around four years after the inception
of the LIA.8 Law No. 13 establishes two main organs: (1) the Board
of Trustees and (2) the Board of Directors.88 The Board of Trustees is
composed of prominent individuals from Libya's political and
governmental bodies, including the Prime Minister, who acts as
Chairman; the Ministers for Planning, Finance, Economy, and Trade;
the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya; and a number of experts.
89 The Board of Trustees has oversight powers and monitors the LIA's
83. See Saigol & O'Murchu, supra note 73 (discussing the LIA's controversial
stake of 7.5% interest in Italy's largest bank, Unicredit); see also Tom Bawden &
John Hooper, Gaddafi's Hidden Billions: Dubai Banks, Plush London Pads and
Italian Water, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2011/feb/22/gaddafi-libya-oil-wealth-portfolio (providing that the Unicredit CEO
did not inform his board of the LIA's increased stake, resulting in him being ousted
and the bank freezing LIA's shareholding in line with EU sanctions).
84. See, e.g., Libyan Investment Authority: Management Information Report,
GLOB. WITNESS 6 (June 30, 2010), https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/
files/lia.pdf [hereinafter KPMG Report] (identifying LIA's equity in France
Telecom).
85. See Mario Beauregard, SNC-Lavalin Fraud Case with Links to Libya Put Off
Until February, GLOBE AND MAIL (May 15, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail
.com/report-on-business/industry-news/the-law-page/snc-lavalin-fraud-case-with-
links-to-libya-put-off-until-february/article26842703/ (noting SNC-Lavalin was
charged with fraud and corruption for allegedly defrauding various Libyan
organizations); see also KPMG Report, supra note 84, at 6 (identifying LIA's equity
in General Electric Co. and SNC-lavalin Group Inc.).
86. See Paravicini, supra note 11; see also KPMG Report, supra note 84, at 6
(identifying LIA's equity in Lagardere S.C.A. & Finmeccanica S.P.A.).
87. See Chris Wright, Inside Libya: The Other Side of the LIA Story, FORBES
(July 24, 2015, 2:14 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chriswright/2015/07/
24/inside-libya-the-other-side-of-the-lia-story/#7eead92a6cf3 [hereinafter Wright,
Inside Libya: The Other Side of the LIA Story].
88. See Sami Zaptia, LIA Gets New Board of Trustees, New Board, Confirms
Chairman and Reform Plan, LIBYA HERALD (July 17, 2017),
https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/07/17/lia-gets-new-board-of-trustees-new-
board-confirms-chairman-and-reform-plan/ [hereinafter Zaptia, LIA Gets New
Board of Trustees, New Board, Confirms Chairman and Reform Plan].
89. What Is Law 13?, LIBYA INVEST. AUTH., http://www.lia.com.mt/en/what-is-
law-13/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) [hereinafter What is Law 13?] ("By Decree No.
2 of 2014, the Council of Ministers, the executive branch of the Libyan Government
appointed in accordance with the governmental mandate of the elected House of
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operations.9" More importantly, the Board of Trustees appoints the six
members of the Board of Directors and the Chairman who represents
the LIA in its transactions with third parties. 91 The Board of Directors
is the organ in charge of the LIA's management.92 In addition to
representing the LIA, the Chairman is also required to ensure that the
LIA functions as an accountable, transparent, and apolitical
institution.93 Three subcommittees (Nomination and Compensation,
Governance, and Audit and Risk) assist the Board of Directors in the
management of the LIA through frequent reporting.94 The Board of
Directors also appoints the LIA's Chief Executive Officer.95
The LIA operates and has offices in Tripoli, La Valletta, and
London. 96 Since November 2014, the general office and investment
operations have been run out of the La Valletta office.9' As we will
show in the following sections, the LIA's multiple offices have added
an additional layer of complexity to disputes over the LIA's leadership
Representatives, decreed the Board of Trustees to comprise the Prime Minister as a
Chairman, the Minister of Finance and Planning, the Minister of Economy and
Industry, the Governor of the Bank of Libya and one named individual.").
90. See Zaptia, LIA Gets New Board of Trustees, New Board, Confirms
Chairman and Reform Plan, supra note 88 (recognizing Fayiz Serraj as Chairman
of the Board of Trustees); Wright, Inside Libya: The Other Side of the LIA Story,
supra note 87 (noting Law 13 "outline[s] how the LIA is deeply embedded in the
democratic principles and statutes of Libya's constitution").
91. Law No. 13 of 2010, art. 13 (Libya); see Wright, Inside Libya: The Other
Side of the LIA Story, supra note 87.
92. Law No. 13 of 2010, arts. 10-11 (Libya); see Wright, Inside Libya: The
Other Side of the LIA Story, supra note 87.
93. See Zaptia, LIA Gets New Board of Trustees, New Board, Confirms
Chairman and Reform Plan, supra note 88.
94. See id.
95. See What Is Law 13?, supra note 89.
96. See Sami Zaptia, LIA Forced to Abandon its Tripoli HQ Due to Militia
Coercion, LIBYA HERALD (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.libyaherald.com/2018/08/
08/lia-forced-to-abandon-its-tripoli-hq-due-to-militia-coercion! (noting the LIA has
not revealed its new headquarters after being force to abandon its Tripoli location
due to military interference; however, there is speculation the new HQ is located in
Malta); Paravicini, supra note 11 (commenting that the LIA office in Valletta served
simply as a "LIA advisory").
97. See Company Overview of The Libyan Investment Authority, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/researchstocks/private/snapshot.asp
?privcapld-46056598; Paravicini, supra note 11.
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and have been used by the different factions to support their separate
agendas.
B. GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES
In the mid-2000s, investments in Western economies by SWFs
from Arab and Asian countries generated concerns in markets and
among politicians because the entities' top leaders were government
officials.98 Moreover, concerns existed over the possible strategic
nature of some SWF investments, and the entities' lack of
transparency as to where their funding comes from.99 These worries
triggered protectionist behaviors in the host States, which were then
reflected in legislation that increased the control of the host State over
foreign investments.' To address the concerns related to SWFs and
keep markets open to investment flows in the prelude of the Global
Financial Crisis, the IMF worked with SWFs and other international
bodies and established a Working Group on SWFs. 1' 1 The Working
Group on SWFs was tasked with drafting new rules to improve SWF
governance, as well as transparency in SWF operations.1 2
After two productive meetings, the Working Group agreed to and
released The Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) in
Santiago, Chile in October 2008.103 The Santiago Principles are part of
98. Cf Steven R. Weisman, Concern About 'Sovereign Wealth Funds' Spreads
to Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/
08/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-wealth.4.7186699.html (highlighting that Arab
and Asian countries are not as transparent in their activities as countries like
Norway).
99. See id. (highlighting that "[a]s Asian countries and petro states get rich, they
certainly have the money to try to exert influence").
100. See id. (discussing the Bush administration pressure on the IMF and World
Bank to examine the behavior of sovereign investment funds and to develop codes
of conduct).
101. IMF, International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds is
Established to Facilitate Work on Voluntary Principles, Press Release No. 08/97
(May 1, 2008), https://www.imf org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr0897.
102. Joseph J. Norton, The 'Santiago Principles 'for Sovereign Wealth Funds: A
Case Study on International Financial Standard-Setting Processes, 13 J. INT'L
EcON. L. 645, 648 (2010) (suggesting "that these Principles are unearthing a type of
international 'rule-oriented' process and set of 'best practices' which are having an
ongoing impact on the operation, governance and decision-making of sovereign
wealth funds").
103. Santiago Principles, supra note 2, at 1.
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a broader, growing trend in international economic law that relies on
soft law norms to regulate the behavior of state and non-state actors.0 4
Soft law formulations, although not legally binding, may still have
practical effects. °5 The first twenty-three Principles cover substantive
requirements regarding the nature, investment, and strategy of SWFs,
and are conventionally divided in three macro-areas ("pillars") that
explain and provide guidelines with respect to: (a) the legal
frameworks, objectives, and coordination with SWFs'
macroeconomic policies (Principles 1 to 5); (b) the institutional
frameworks and governance structures of SWFs (Principles 6 to 17);
and (c) SWFs' investment and risk management frameworks
(Principles 18 to 23).116 SWFs' compliance with the Santiago
Principles is crucial. A few of the principles are of critical importance
in this particular case. First, Principle 19 calls for the maximization of
risk-adjusted financial returns 1 7 and requires a fund to disclose in its
investment policy any non-economic and/or non-financial
considerations that shape its investment strategy.0 8 Additionally, the
104. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SOFT LAW 82-83 (Andrea K.
Bjorklund & August Reinisch eds., 2012) (explaining that "[r]ecent developments
in investment law, however, together with the trends in international law more
generally, suggest that it is now appropriate to consider the potential use of soft law
instruments within international investment law, and indeed, the feasibility of the
narrower task of codification of its principles and rules."); see also Norton, supra
note 102, at 645 (characterizing the process of working with and regulating
sovereign wealth funds as "a sui generis, ad hoc, multi-level, rule-oriented
governance network process"); Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates
International Finance-and Not Trade, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 623, 623-24 (2010)
("Both trade and finance are clearly key areas addressed by 'international economic
law,' and their rules have important consequences for global markets.").
105. A classic definition of soft law is: "rules of conduct which, in principle, have
no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects." Francis
Snyder, Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community, in THE
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EMILE NotL 197, 198 (Steve
Martin ed., 1994); see Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law:
Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 850, 857
(1989) (noting that the notion of instant customary soft law seems incompatible with
most "revolutionary" soft law).
106. Santiago Principles, supra note 2, at 11.
107. Id. at 8 ("The SWF's investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-
adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy and based
on economic and financial grounds.").
108. Id. ("If investment decisions are subject to other than economic and financial
considerations, these should be clearly set out in the investment policy and be
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use of sophisticated financial instruments with the objective of
avoiding the application of UNSC sanctions explicitly clashes with
Principle 19,109 and with the Santiago Principles in general. Moreover,
Principle 22 requires a fund to have a risk management framework and
culture to: (1) identify, (2) assess, (3) manage its risks and to (4)
protect its assets and stay within the tolerance levels set in its
investment policy. 110
In general, most of the Santiago Principles prescribe the nature and
form of SWFs' existence, governance, and operations. However,
Principle 24 focuses on the adoption and implementation of the
Santiago Principles through the creation of a review mechanism based
on a self-assessment or third-party assessment to be determined by the
SWF leadership and its owner."' In April 2009, the International
Working Group that drafted the Santiago Principles was transformed
into the IFSWF. 112 The IFSWF is a voluntary group that works on
improving adherence to the objectives of the Santiago Principles and
enhancing transparency so as to contribute to an open investment
environment. 1"3
publicly disclosed.") (emphasis in original).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 23 ("The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and
manages the risks of its operations."); id. ("It is important for the SWF to have a
strong risk management culture, where senior management is engaged in crafting
and enforcing risk management processes, and a well-functioning risk management
framework to ensure that it is able to identify, assess, and manage its risks to protect
its assets and stay within the tolerance levels as set in the investment policy.").
111. Id. at 9 ("A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP
should be engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF.").
112. "Kuwait Declaration" Establishment of the International Forum of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, IFSWF (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.ifswf org/santiago-
principles-landing/kuwait-declaration [hereinafter Kuwait Declaration] ("[T]he
IWG reached a consensus ('Kuwait Declaration') on April 6, 2009 in Kuwait City
to establish the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds.").
113. Santiago Principles, supra note 2, at 4 ("The generally accepted principles
and practices (GAPP), therefore, is underpinned by the following guiding objectives
for SWFs: i. To help maintain a stable global financial system and free flow of
capital and investment; ii. To comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure
requirements in the countries in which they invest; iii. To invest on the basis of
economic and financial risk and return-related considerations; and iv. To have in
place a transparent and sound governance structure that provides for adequate
operational controls, risk management, and accountability.").
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The LIA, together with some of the most influential SWFs, was a
member of the Working Group and has been a member of the IFSWF
since its establishment." 4 Endorsing the Santiago Principles is a
precondition for SWFs looking to join the IFSWF."15 When the
Santiago Principles were issued, the LIA's leadership pledged to
increase the fund's transparency and to publish annual reports online
in both Arabic and English." 6
The IFSWF has published the results of two self-assessment
procedures, evaluating compliance with the Santiago Principles."'
The first assessment results were published in 2014 and involved
fifteen SWFs,118 and the second assessment results were issued in 2016
and involved twelve SWFs. 119  The self-assessments are not
compulsory; rather, SWFs perform assessments on a voluntary basis,
because they are expected to do so as members of the IFSWF, and
because performing these self-assessments demonstrates the SWF's
commitment to better governance and greater transparency. 12 It is
important to note that the LIA did not participate in either of the two
procedures, which could negatively affect the LIA's reputation vis-Ai-
vis investment-recipient countries (and the UNSC) for failing to
adhere to expectations and principles outlined in international soft law
instruments. 21 Conversely, the LIA's lack of participation in these
114. See Our Members, supra note 4.
115. Kuwait Declaration, supra note 112 ("Membership will be open to other
Funds who meet the Santiago Principles definition of a SWF and endorse the
Santiago Principles.").
116. See Santiago Principles, supra note 2, at 39 (discussing "Reporting and
transparency").
117. See INT'L FORUM OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, IMPLEMENTING THE
SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES: 12 CASE STUDIES 5 (Nov. 2016), http://www.ifswf org/
sites/default/files/IFSWF CaseStudies Nov2016_0.pdf [hereinafter SANTIAGO
PRINCIPLES: 12 CASE STUDIES]; see also INT'L FORUM OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS, SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES: 15 CASE STUDIES 6 (Nov. 2014),
http://www.ifswf org/sites/default/files/SantiagoPl5CaseStudies l_O.pdf
[hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES: 15 CASE STUDIES].
118. See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES: 15 CASE STUDIES, supra note 117, at 5.
119. See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES: 12 CASE STUDIES, supra note 117, at 5.
120. See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES: 15 CASE STUDIES, supra note 117, at 5.
121. It deserves to be mentioned that, despite the difficulties faced, the Malta-
based management has engaged with international consultants (i.e. Oliver Wyman),
which have audited the accounting and organization of the LIA. See SANTIAGO
PRINCIPLES: 12 CASE STUDIES, supra note 117, at 2; see also id. at 3. But see Sarah
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procedures may not have undermined its reputation at all being that a
large number of SWFs have not joined the IFSWF or pledged to
comply in any way with the Santiago Principles. 122 However, the
application of the Santiago Principles would help the LIA to improve
its international profile. A 2016 assessment by the Natural Resource
Governance Institute (NRGI) determined that the LIA is not in
compliance with the Santiago Principles. 123 The LIA needs to take
steps in this regard to demonstrate that its management is making
serious efforts to improve its transparency, 124 governance, and overall
compliance with internationally accepted standards. 125 We argue that
such actions would positively affect many aspects of the fund's
activities, such as governance and investment results.
The UNSC has also echoed this call for compliance. In Resolution
2009, the UNSC requested that the IMF and World Bank "work with
the Libyan authorities on an assessment of Libya's public financial
management framework, which would recommend steps to be taken
by Libya to ensure a system of transparency and accountability with
respect to the funds held by Libyan governmental institutions,
Townsend, This is the Wealth of the Libyan People and it Has to Come Home,
ARABIAN Bus. (Aug. 1, 2015, 2:41 PM), https://www.arabianbusiness.com/-this-is-
wealth-of-libyan-people-it-has-come-home--601012.html (stating that Bouhadi
seeks to restructure the LIA in accordance with the proposal of Oliver Wyman, an
international consultant).
122. See IE FOUND., SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 2017 17 (2017),
https://www.ie.edu/fundacion ie/Investigacion Aplicada/Centros/SOVEREIGN
WEALTH LAB REPORT 2017.pdf (noting there are more than 115 "operating or
prospective" sovereign wealth funds in 2017 even though the IFSWF is comprised
of 33 members).
123. See Yusser Al-Gayed, New Libyan Oil Wealth Fund Chief Talks Reform,
Transparency, NAT'L RES. GOVERNANCE INST. (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/new-libyan-investment-authority-chief-talks-
house-cleanup-organizational-mandate (stating the NRGI determined that the LIA
met only four of the sixteen regulatory standards, thus concluding "the LIA is non-
compliant with the Santiago Principles").
124. See Libyan Investment Authority, supra note 1 (noting the LIA received a
Transparency Rating of 4 out of 10 on the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index).
125. At the time of writing, the LIA's website does not provide clear and
comprehensive information in relation to the composition of its board, its
governance, its past and present economic situation, or its investment portfolio and
strategy. See LIBYAN INV. AUTH., http://www.lia.com.ly/ar/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2018).
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including the LIA.' 1 26 Despite UNSC action, the LIA has not
collaborated with the IMF since 2013.12 Consultations between Libya
and the IMF in application of Article IV of the IMF's Articles of
Agreement -which provides for regular, annual visits of IMF staff to
the state-were interrupted in 2013.128 The last IMF Country Report
for Libya offers a critical analysis of the LIA's condition:
Staff argued that the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) should be
integrated into the fiscal framework. Libya's sovereign wealth fund (SWF)
system, operating through the LIA and the budget reserve account (BRA)
at the CBL, should be fully integrated into this framework, with well-
defined and transparent rules determining the inflows to and outflows from
the LIA and the BRA. Currently, the LIA lacks a clear definition of
objectives and the rules governing the accumulation, management, and use
of its resources. Accordingly, staff recommended that the LIA should
function as a savings fund for future generations as well as a stabilization
fund to better manage oil price cycles . . . . Along with well-defined
investment objectives, the LIA also needs to improve transparency and
accountability in its governance, consistent with international good
practices. 129
The IMF's suggestions are a clear reference to the application of the
Santiago Principles, which develop the transparency and good practice
governance standards for SWFs. 130 The report also indicates that, at
the time, the Libyan authorities appreciated the suggestions made by
126. S.C. Res. 2009, supra note 35, 18.
127. See IMF, List of IMF Member Countries with Delays in Completion of
Article IV Consultations or Mandatory Financial Stability Assessments Over 18
Months, at 2 (June 2018), http://www.imf org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/
Issues/2018/06/28/pp062818-list-of-imf-members-with-delayed-article-ivs\ (noting
that Libya's last consultation occurred in May 2013).
128. See id. (noting the "Main Reason for Delay" is the "Political/security
situation" in Libya).
129. IMF, Libya: 2013 Article IV Consultation, at 17-18, Country Report No.
13/150 (May 2, 2013), https://www.imforg/externalpubs/ft/scr/2013/crl3l5O.pdf
[hereinafter IMF, Libya: 2013 Article IV Consultation] (emphasis added).
130. Compare IMF, Libya: 2013 Article IV Consultation, supra note 129, at 20
("The authorities need to articulate and then implement a strategic vision for
economic development which includes steps to set up a governance framework
linked to transparency and accountability, including anti-corruption elements."),
with Santiago Principles, supra note 2, at 4 (naming one of the GAPP rules
objectives, "iv. To have in place a transparent and sound governance structure that
provides for adequate operational controls, risk management, and accountability.").
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the IMF team and committed to tackling problems related to the LIA's
governance framework.'3 ' These commitments were followed by a
period of inaction stemming from the instability in the LIA's
management, due to Libya's political struggles. 3 2 However, in 2016,
the LIA started to collaborate with the NRGI to improve transparency
and good governance.'33 In the following section we discuss the power
play for the LIA's leadership and look at the Gaddafi regime's
influence, and the political divisions that have undermined the LIA's
governance, creating negative consequences for the fund's assets and
Libyan people as the fund's intended beneficiaries.
C. A "GAME OF THRONES" AND THE LONG SHADOW OF THE
REGIME
The LIA's management and leadership are of paramount
importance, and the relationship between the fund's high-level
personnel and the Gaddafi family and regime has had serious
implications for the current management of the fund. The fund's past
and current management leadership is at the center of disputes in
domestic courts concerning abuses of the fund that may cause further
dissipation of the Libyan national wealth.'34
At the establishment of the fund, experts with a long history and
credentials in the Arab banking environment were appointed to the
LIA's leadership.'35 Mohammed H. Layas was appointed as the LIA's
founding President'3 6 and Hatim Gheriani was named Chief
131. IMF, Libya: 2013 Article IV Consultation, supra note 129 (quoting Mr.
Shakour A. Shaalan, Executive Director for Libya: "On behalf of the Libyan
authorities, I thank staff for their recent engagement and constructive Article IV
Consultation discussions. The authorities highly value the views of the Fund on
Libya's economic policies and institution-building efforts.").
132. See Al-Gayed, supra note 123 (stating that the LIA's organizational structure
"fractured" causing "a split into two parallel authorities").
133. We were not able to find any substantial outcome of this collaboration at the
time of writing. Id. ("NRGI is assisting Libya to improve governance throughout the
natural resource value chain. NRGI will host a 26 October workshop to present its
findings to the LIA steering committee and other stakeholders.").
134. See generally Libyan Inv. Auth. v. Goldman Sachs Int'l [2016] EWHC (Ch)
2530 (Eng.).
135. See id. [21]-[24].
136. See id [14], [204]. Before becoming Head and CEO of the LIA, Mr. Layas
held senior positions in the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank and the Arab Banking
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Investment Officer. 137 But individuals notorious for their close
connection to members of the Gaddafi family were also appointed to
the LIA's ranks. 38 For example, Mustafa Zarti, 39 a close friend of Saif
al-Islam Gaddafi (Muammar Gaddafi's son), was appointed
Mohammed Layas' deputy. 4 ' Zarti has been described as the person
who is, de facto, in charge of the fund.'4 ' This leadership triumvirate
was a fayade used to mask the regime's control over the SWF. 14 2
Evidence suggests that the SWF's investment strategy was also
influenced by the regime. 4 3 Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime, the
LIA has faced continuous challenges due to the political divisions
within the state and because of disputes about whether the fund's
management should remain in place.'44 In some cases, the experts
called in to lead the LIA post-Gaddafi have been accused of links to
Corporation (which counts among its major shareholders the Central Bank of Libya
and the Kuwait Investment Authority).
137. See id. [15]-[16]. Gheriani was working in the private sector before joining
the LIA, where he also headed the Alternative Investments Team.
138. See id. [189].
139. Even though Mr. Layas and Mr. Gheriani possess strong credentials and have
had successful careers, their financial expertise has been criticized in relation to
some of the financial operations that caused important losses to the LIA. They have
been also subjected to further scrutiny that has led to litigation in the UK and the
US. See id. [197]-[223].
140. See Libyan Inv. Auth. [2016] EWHC (Ch) [14], [189].
141. See Hugh Miles, How Libya's SaifAl-Islam Gaddafi Seduced the West, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 4, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12626320 (last visited
Sept. 9, 2018) (explaining from an interview with a Libyan investment banker that
Zarti was not named deputy chairman of the LIA because he was a talented investor,
but rather Saif appointed his "old college friend" Zarti because of he was loyal).
142. See id. (stating that new evidence suggests that Saif controlled the LIA's
sovereign wealth fund).
143. See Wright, Ousted Head ofLibyan Investment Authority Speaks Out, supra
note 71 (citing an interview with Mohsen Derregia, who stated that at the time of his
arrival, some investment decisions were made by Seif Gaddafi and his father on
behalf of the LIA board to invest in "all kinds of ad hoc investments" that created a
"huge mess" in the portfolio).
144. This division is conspicuously evidenced by two competing websites, one
with its country code top-level domain in Malta (http://www.lia.com.mt), and the
other in Libya (http://lia.ly). Heba Saleh & Andrew England, Libya Sovereign
Wealth Fund Chief to Appeal to UN Over Frozen Assets, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/a9be923c-2349-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0al6 ("But Mr
Mahmoud has two domestic rivals each claiming to be the rightful leader of the fund
- disputes that reflect deep political divides.").
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the Gaddafi regime, even when the links were tenuous.'45
In April 2012, Mohsen Derregia interrupted his career as an
academic in the United Kingdom to take on a new and difficult role as
LIA's CEO in the aftermath of the fall of the Gaddafi regime.'46 He
brought claims against the Italian Government that led to the
unfreezing of accounts and shares held by the LIA in Italy 4 and
performed internal reviews that then led to the LIA bringing claims
against Goldman Sachs and Socit6 Gdndrale S.A.'48 After a year of
Derregia's activism and initial success in regaining control over some
of the LIA's assets located in Italy, he was replaced pro tempore by
the deputy governor of the Central Bank of Libya, Ali Mohamed
Hibri.149 Hibri, in turn, stepped down when Abdulmagid Breish was
appointed Chairman in June 2013.150 However, in 2014, Breish was
investigated for his participation in the former regime, given that under
the Political and Administrative Isolation Law, officials from the
Gaddafi era may not hold government positions.' 5 ' Breish stepped
145. Chris Wright, Inside Libya: Interview With LIA Sovereign Wealth Fund
Chairman Breish, FORBES (July 23, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/chriswright/2015/07/23/inside-libya-interview-with-lia-sovereign-wealth-fund
-chairman-breish!#854c58854259 [hereinafter Wright, Inside Libya: LIA Breish
Interview, Part Two] ("Breish, who was chairman of the LIA, then had to step down
while he was investigated for his previous links with the Gaddafi administration,
then was cleared of those links by a Libyan court and (he says) reinstated, though
the competing LIA in Malta contends that he has not been reinstated at all.").
146. See Wright, The Battle for the Libyan Investment Authority, supra note 33
(stating that prior to being named chairman of the Libyan Investment Authority,
Mohsen Derregia was a professor at University of Nottingham Business School).
147. See Corte di Appello di Roma (Rome Court of Appeal), Sezione Quarta
Penale, N4/12 R.G.I.E. 23.7.2012 (on file with author).
148. The LIA was unable to prevail in its claim against Goldman Sachs. See
Libyan Inv. Auth. v. Goldman Sachs Int'l [2016] EWHC (Ch) 2530, [427]-[428]
(Eng.).
149. See Wright, The Battle for the Libyan Investment Authority, supra note 33.
150. See Tim Wallace, Libyan Investment Authority's Case Against Goldman
Sachs and SocGen is Back On, TELEGRAPH (July 2, 2015, 10:23 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/ 11713902/Lib
yan-Investment-Authoritys-case-against-Goldman- Sachs-and- SocGen-is-back-
on.html.
151. See Jess Delaney, Libya's Sovereign Fund May Hold Key to Country's Civil
War, INSTITUTIONAL INV'R (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/
article/b 14ywvp62n58qr/libyas-sovereign-fund-may-hold-key-to-countrys-civil-
war (stating that because of the Political and Administrative Isolation Law, Breish
stepped down after one year of holding the holding the position of Chairman); Feras
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down during the investigation' 2 and was substituted ad interim by the
former Minister of Oil, Abdulrahman Ben Yezza.'53 Meanwhile,
following the June 2014 House of Representatives elections, the
"Tobruk government" was formed.'54 The Tobruk government had
some international recognition, and Prime Minister Abdullah al-
Thani, appointed Hassan Bouhadi as CEO of the LIA.'55 Bouhadi
operated the LIA from the fund's Malta offices.'56 After being cleared
by the investigation, Breish resumed his role as CEO, working out of
the Tripoli offices, with support from the Tripoli-based legislative
authority, the General National Congress. 5
Although Bouhadi and Breish both claimed the leadership of the
LIA, both parties agreed that the frozen LIA assets and Libyan African
Investment Portfolio should remain so, pending the establishment of a
Government of National Accord (GNA), "which was also the best
protection against misappropriation."' 58 Both parties also agreed on
pursing the disputes against Goldman Sachs and Socidt6 Gdndrale to
retrieve lost structured financial instruments.'59 Meanwhile, both
contenders were also engaged in multiple-front legal battles over the
LIA's leadership. 6 ' Breish initiated domestic legal proceedings to
Bosalum & Ulf Laessing, Head ofLibya Investment Fund Steps Down Over Political
Law, REUTERS (July 9, 2014, 7:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/libya-
investment/head-of-libya-investment-fund-steps-down-over-political-law-idUSL6
NOPK5Q 120140709.
152. Bosalum & Laessing, supra note 151 ("Breish quit after an investigation
under a law which bans people from taking a public office if they had a function in
the regime of late strongman Muammar Gaddafi .... ").
153. Id. ("Former Oil Minster Abdulrahman Benyezza has taken over as acting
head of the fund ... ").
154. Libya's Tripoli Government to Step Down, BBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35974641 (last visited Oct. 7, 2018) ("The
Tobruk government is backed by what is still the internationally recognised
parliament and Libya's only legislative body under a UN-backed agreement.").
155. See Delaney, supra note 151.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to
Resolution 1973 (2011), 230, U.N. Doc. S/2016/209 (Mar. 9, 2016) [hereinafter
2016 Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya].
159. Delaney, supra note 151 ("Breish... agreed with Bouhadi to make a joint
application to the High Court to appoint a receiver, or trustee, to instruct the lawyers
on the LIA's behalf until the rival claims to the fund's authority were resolved.").
160. Wright, Inside Libya: LIA Breish Interview, Part Two, supra note 145 ("For
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challenge his opponent for the LIA's leadership.' 6 ' On the other hand,
Bouhadi, who was still heading the LIA and managing part of its
assets62 from the Malta office,'63 challenged Breish's leadership in the
UK courts.'64 In light of the Libya Political Agreement, in which both
of the parties pledged support for the GNA as the sole legitimate
government of Libya endorsed by the UNSC,'65 Judge Blair adjourned
the proceedings.'66 In his decision, Judge Blair also cited UNSC
all practical purposes I consider myself to be the chairman and I consider them to be
rogue directors. I have filed with the public prosecutor in Libya criminal cases
against them.").
161. See Claire Milhench, LIA Leadership Case Adjourned, Judge Says
Premature to Rule, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2016, 7:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-libya-security-swflia-leadership-case-adj ourned-judge-says-premature-
to-rule-idUSKCNOW9003.
162. Bouhadi sought the right to manage the frozen accounts to avoid ulterior
losses to the LIA without challenging the validity of the sanctions. See ANGELA
CUMMINE, CITIZENS' WEALTH: WHY (AND How) SOVEREIGN FUNDS SHOULD BE
MANAGED BY THE PEOPLE FOR THE PEOPLE 51-52 (2016) (describing Mr. Bouhadi's
appointment as LIA chairman by the Board of Trustees in October of 2014); see also
Libby George & Dmitry Zhdannikov, Libya Investment Fund Seeks Management
Right Amid Freeze, REUTERS (July 8, 2015, 8:41 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/libya-investment-fund/libya-investment-fund-seeks-management-right-
amid-freeze-idUSL8NOZO 17220150708.
163. See CUMMINE, supra note 162, at 51-52; see also George & Zhdannikov,
supra note 162.
164. Jane Croft, Power Struggle Over Libya's LIA Spills into UK High Court, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/a6e22040-5561-11e5-9846-
de406ccb37f2.
165. S.C. Res. 2259, 3 (Dec. 23, 2015) ("Endorses the Rome Communiqu6 of
13 December 2015 to support the Government of National Accord as the sole
legitimate government of Libya") (emphasis in original). Further, after a meeting of
Foreign Ministers in 2017, the G7 group "welcome[d] progress made in the Libyan
economic dialogue and recall[ed] the necessity of an exclusive control of the
[Presidency Council] over Libyan economic institutions and resources[,]
encourage[d] effective cooperation between the [Presidency Council], the GNA, and
the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) to ensure the GNA has the necessary tools to
implement its fiscal and monetary policies for the wellbeing of all Libyans[,] [and]
call[ed] on the GNA and the CBL to fully implement their agreement to keep the
legitimate economy functioning, ensure the necessary funds for government
activities, [and] bring the budget under control and end the liquidity crisis." Group
of Seven [G7], G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Lucca, 10-11 April 2017 Joint
Communique, at 10-11 (Apr. 10-11, 2017), http://www.g7italy.it/sites/default/
files/documents/G7 FMM Joint Communique.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2018)
(alteration to the original).
166. Bouhadi v. Breish, [2016] EWHC (Comm) 602, [1], [45] (Eng.).
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Resolution 2259, which calls upon the GNA to protect the integrity
and unity of the LIA. 167 The U.K. court's decision and the broad
international support for the GNA did not pacify the two factions,
which continued to disagree over the rightful management of the
LIA. 168 In August 2016, after compelling Bouhadi to step down, the
Tobruk government appointed Ali Shamekh to lead the LIA from the
fund's La Valletta office.169
In August 2016, Fayez Serraj, leader of the Presidency Council of
the GNA, issued a decree that formed an Interim Steering Committee
for the LIA's administration. 17 Dr. Ali Mahmoud was appointed to act
as President of the Steering Committee. 171 The Committee was
"appointed to temporarily administer and steer the [LIA] and ha[d] the
privileges and terms of reference of the Board of Directors and
Chairman with a view to safeguard the normal administration of the
company.' 172 However, the Committee was not permitted "to
undertake any measures regarding disposition of the [LIA]'s assets
and their transfer."' '17 As President of the Committee, Dr. Mahmoud
was therefore empowered to, inter alia, undertake legal action on
behalf of the LIA, but was not permitted to engage in management of
the fund stricto sensu. 17' At the same time, Breish, 17 still in control of
167. Id. [45].
168. See Sami Zaptia, Contending LIA Chairman Breish Slams Serraj and his LIA
Appointee, LIBYA HERALD (June 4, 2017), https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/06/
04/contending-lia-chairman-breish-slams- serraj-and-his-lia-appointee/.
169. See Sami Zaptia, LIA Chairman Bouhadi Resigns as HoR Appoint Their Man
Shamekh as CEO, LIBYA HERALD (Aug. 13, 2016), https://www.libyaherald.com/
2016/08/13/lia-chairman-bouhadi-resigns-as-hor-appoint-their-man-shamekh!.
170. See Libyan Investment Authority [LIA], The Presidential Council of the
Government of National Accord, Decision Number (115) in 2016 Regarding the
Formation of a Steering Committee and Commissioning of Tasks, art. 1 (Aug. 15,
2016), http://www.lia.com.mt/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Presidential-Council-
Resolution-No.- 115-of-2016-English-Certified-Translation.pdf
171. See id.
172. Id. art. 2.
173. Id. art. 4.
174. Id. art. 3 ("The Committee is assigned to pursue all grievances and lawsuits
locally and abroad initiated by or against the Authority, whether these were before
a judiciary or arbitration committee or other similarly appointed committees. To
work on safeguarding all the rights of the Authority and to ensure all appropriate
measures are undertaken.").
175. Saleh & England, supra note 144.
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the fund's Tripoli offices, 176 continued to claim the leadership over the
Libyan SWF 177 and Shamekh continued to represent the LIA in
international gatherings of SWFs. 178 Breish succeeded in challenging
the validity of the Interim Steering Committee in the Libyan courts,
and in January 2017 the Tripoli Appeals Court ordered the
cancellation of the Presidential Council of the GNA's Decision 115.'79
This contested leadership and its effects on the LIA have also been
noted by the six-person Panel of Experts on Libya established under
UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011), which issued its Final Report on June
1, 2017.180 Referring to an earlier report issued by another Panel of
Experts established pursuant to the same UNSC resolution,' 8' the
Panel observed the impact of sanctions on the governance of the LIA:
The Panel has previously reported on the rigidity of the current sanctions
regime and how the Authority's assets lose value after investments have
matured because they cannot be reinvested.... This situation remains
unchanged, to the frustration of the Authority's managers. However, it will
be difficult to modify the sanctions regime and resolve such management
issues while the fund remains divided. 1
82
The Panel of Experts' argument is valid. While the leadership of the
SWF remains divided it could be risky to vary the sanctions regime.
However, the following section will show that, although such a claim
176. Id.
177. Breish challenged the legitimacy of the Steering Committee in the Libyan
courts. See CUMMINE, supra note 162, at 51-52.
178. For example, Shamekh attended the Global Sovereign Wealth Forum 2017,
which took place in London in March 2017. The event was not organized by the
IFSWF. See Breish: The So-Called LIA Interim Steering Committee Creates
'Uncertainty and Confusion', LIBYAN EXPRESS (Oct. 24, 2016, 2:35 PM),
https://www.libyanexpress.com/breish-the-so-called-lia-interim-steering-
committee-creates-uncertainty-and-confusion/.
179. See Exclusive: Tripoli Appeals Court's Order Shows Cancellation of PC's
LIA Steering Committee, LIBYAN EXPRESS (Feb. 7, 2017, 4:40 PM),
http://www.libyanexpress.com/exclusive-tripoli-appeals-courts-order-shows-
cancellation-of-pcs-lia-steering-committee/print.
180. Final Rep. of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to
Resolution 1973 (2011), 216-26, U.N. Doc. S/2017/466 (June 1, 2017)
[hereinafter 2017 Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya].
181. See 2016 Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya, supra note 158, 227-
30, 252-60 (describing the parameters regarding the frozen assets of the LIA).
182. 2017 Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya, supra note 180, 227.
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might have merit, the original justification for the inclusion of the LIA
on the Sanctions List-to prevent its assets being used as a source of
funding for the Gaddafi regime-has been without merit since the
collapse of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya upon Gaddafi's death.
Only in July 2017 did the GNA form a new Board of Trustees,
which, in application of Law No. 13 of 2010, includes the Prime
Minister of the GNA; the Ministers of Finance, Planning, and
Economy; and the Governor of the Libyan Central Bank.'83
Consequently, the new Board of Trustees appointed the former
members of the Interim Steering Committee to the Board of Directors,
and appointed Dr. Ali Mahmoud to be Board's the new Chairman. 184
This section has shown that LIA's relationship with the regime in
Libya has been detrimental to the governance of the SWF. This is
evidenced by the influence of the Gaddafi family over the fund, and
the power struggles between the different factions, which are
reflective of the state's unstable political situation. In the past decade,
domestic politics have undermined the governance of the fund, its
ability to acquire know-how, and ability to properly invest and
generate returns. Despite initial involvement in international
procedures and bodies that work to improve governance and
transparency of SWFs, the LIA has repeatedly failed to meet the
international standards set in the Santiago Principles. The LIA's
political divisions and disputed management have been reflected in the
IFSWF's weakened membership, which has in turn negatively
affected the LIA's reputation as an international investor. On the other
hand, similar circumstances in the future might require the IFSWF to
take action to address issues of contested management and
membership.
183. Zaptia, LIA Gets New Board of Trustees, New Board, Confirms Chairman
and Reform Plan, supra note 88 (providing a statement from Faiez Serraj saying
"[t]his is a positive step that reaffirms the LIA as the authoritative and rightful body
mandated by the Presidential Council and the GNA, thus endorsed and supported by
the United Nations and the International Community").
184. See GNA Appoints New LIA Board of Trustees, LIBYA-BUS. NEWS (July 18,
2017), https://www.libya-businessnews.com/2017/07/18/gna-appoints-new-lia-
board-of-trustees/. The new Board of Directors has established an annual plan that
includes among its primary objectives working towards good governance and
transparency and improving the LIA's adherence to the Santiago Principles.
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Despite the aforementioned, there is still hope. The belated solution
to address political divisions led to the formation of a new Board of
Directors, which benefits from greater political support. 8 ' The new
Board is gaining control over the LIA and is starting to consider
investment projects.'86 While Shamekh eventually gave up his
leadership position within the LIA, 8 Breish, on the other hand, still
claims to be the LIA's Chairman.'88 As of the moment of writing this
article, the authors expect and suggest a greater engagement on the
part of the LIA with the IFSWF and other International Financial
Institutions (IFIs). Such engagement with the IFSWF, and the
provision of self-assessments to show adherence to the Santiago
Principles, will help to enhance the LIA's transparency and improve
its governance. 8 9 It will also help the LIA build its reputation as a
credible and reliable international investor. One can hope that the LIA
185. Aidan Lewis, Libya's U.N.-Backed Government Moves to Take Control of
Wealth Fund, REUTERS (July 18, 2017, 11:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-libya-swf/libyas-u-n-backed-government-moves-to-take-control-of-
wealth-fund-idUSKBN1A3 100 ("[T]he new board of trustees included the GNA's
prime minister, the ministers of finance, planning, and economy, and the governor
of Tripoli's central bank."); see generally supra Section III.A (explaining LIA's
troubled history).
186. See Sami Zaptia, LAP Considering Increased Investments in "Profitable"
Morocco, LIBYA HERALD (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.libyaherald.com/
2018/03/13/lap-considering-increased-investments-in-profitable-morocco/
(providing that the LIA subsidiary, Libya Africa Investment Portfolio, has been
"considering increasing its investments in Morocco").
187. See Claire Milhench, Ali Shamekh Resigns from CEO Post at Libyan
Sovereign Fund, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2018, 6:43 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-libya-swf-shamekhali-shamekh-resigns-from-ceo-post-at-libyan-
sovereign-fund-idUSKCN1GD4UI (following his resignation as chief executive of
the LIA, Shamekh provided a statement claiming that it was impossible to
implement a viable program due to divisions within Libya).
188. See Breish: Political Interference in the Libyan Investment Authority Must
Stop, LIBYAN EXPRESS (Feb. 24, 2018, 12:12 PM), http://www.libyanexpress.com/
breish-political-interference-in-the-libyan-investment-authority-must-stop/
(considering himself to be the Chairman, Breish has voiced his concerns of the
confusion surrounding the legality of the LIA's funds).
189. Larry C. Backer, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Sovereign
Wealth Funds (SWFs) as Instruments to Combat Corruption and Enhance Fiscal
Discipline in Developing States, INT'L REV. L., May 9, 2015, at 4-5,
http://www.qscience.com/doi/10.5339/irl.2015.swf.5 ("It now appears that IFI's
may come to view the SWFs as a useful part of the IFI's lending and capacity
building toolkits for developing states that meet certain criteria.").
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has already taken its first steps towards good governance as the new
Board has begun to engage closely with the NGRI and the Oman
Investment Fund. 9 ' However, we are cognizant that political stability
and support for the GNA are necessary preconditions to the LIA
making such progress.
IV. REVISITING THE ASSET FREEZE ON THE LIA
The UNSC requested the asset freeze measures in Resolution 1970
under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, 191 measures that, according to
Article 39 of the same document, "shall be taken.., to maintain or
restore international peace and security.' 1 92 Additionally, in listing the
LIA as an entity whose funds must be frozen, the UNSC identified the
utility of the SWF to the Gaddafi family and regime as the justification
for its inclusion. 193 However, Muammar Gaddafi was killed by rebel
forces in his hometown of Sirte on October 20, 2011, and his regime
collapsed at his death, if not earlier. 194 Additionally, of the surviving
members of the Gaddafi family and regime named on the 1970
Sanctions List, the majority either fled Libya and/or were captured,
190. See, e.g., GNA Appoints New LIA Board of Trustees, supra note 184. Libyan
media reports that key staff members from the Oman Investment Fund are assisting
the LIA to improve its governance standards and to adopt the Santiago Principles.
The Oman Investment Fund, which shares its date of inception with the LIA, is not
currently a full member of the IFSWF. With the difficulties to access information
one can only imagine that the other Omani SWF, the State General Reserve Fund,
which has been an IFSWF member since March 2015 and is compliant with the
Principles, is also playing a role in the process. The SGRF has recently been active
and held a workshop with the IFSWF focused on communication and reporting.
191. U.N. Charter art. 41 (stipulating that the Security Council may choose from
measures that include the "complete or partial interruption of economic relations").
The measures in Resolutions 1973 and 2009 were also adopted under Chapter VII.
192. Id. art. 39.
193. S.C. Res. 1970, 17 (Feb. 26, 2011) ("[AIll Member States shall ensure that
any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made
available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories,
to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities listed in Annex II of this resolution
or individuals designated by the Committee.").
194. See, e.g., VANDEWALLE, supra note 7, at 208.
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with a number facing trial in Libya and overseas.'95 In the words of the
March 21, 2016 Letter:
When the assets freeze was originally put in place, it was of course not
intended as a punishment to Libya, but rather a protective measure to
protect the assets against dissipation during the revolution and the transition
after the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Yet the assets freeze is now having a
very serious negative impact on the interests of the Libyan people. 1
96
When the UNSC adopted Resolutions 1970 and 1973, the
justification put forward for the inclusion of the LIA reflected a
legitimate concern that the access of the Gaddafi family and regime to
LIA funds might serve to prolong the violence in Libya. However, it
can hardly be plausibly argued that the threat posed by the Gaddafi
regime and family, most of whom are in custody and/or reside outside
of Libya, 197 and have no (claim to) control over the LIA, continues to
provide the rationale for including the SWF on the Resolution 1970
Sanctions List. Rather, as the March 21, 2016 Letter proposes, the
justification for its continued listing is to avoid the "dissipation" of
assets during the transition period.198 Nonetheless, the "narrative
summaries of reasons for listing individuals and entities" provided in
2011 continues to be invoked. 199 This is not necessarily to say that the
UNSC should have lifted the sanctions imposed on the LIA, although
such an argument could perhaps be made. Rather, in the view of the
authors, the UNSC ought to have revisited, and revised, the reasons
for its inclusion on the Sanctions List following the fall of the Gaddafi
regime in Libya.
There is a delisting procedure available to individuals and entities
listed on U.N. sanctions lists. However, as of the time of this writing,
only two individuals-and no entities-listed by the Libya Sanctions
195. Of the 20 individuals listed on the Resolution 1970 Sanctions List at the time
of writing, six are believed to be deceased, four are believed to be in custody or with
restricted movement, and four are believed to be residing overseas (but not in
custody). See Sanctions List, supra note 45.
196. Dabbashi, supra note 13, 3.
197. See Sanctions List, supra note 45; S.C. Res. 2253, 35 (Dec. 17, 2015).
198. Dabbashi, supra note 13, 1.
199. See Sanctions List, supra note 45.
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Committee have submitted de-listing requests to the body tasked with
considering such requests.00
As for the rationale behind providing "narrative summaries of
reasons for listing individuals and entities," discussing the Sanctions
Committee pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011)
concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,20'
Clemens Feindiugle expressed the view that the obligation to publish a
narrative summary "serves due process purposes, i.e. the right to be
informed and thus the fair procedure ... and which increases
transparency concerning the reasons for listings. '20 2 In reaching this
conclusion concerning the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Feindiugle
cites the Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work, the
latest version (incorporating individuals and entities associated with
ISIL or Da'esh) which provides:
For all entries on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, the
Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in coordination
with the relevant designating State(s), shall continue to make accessible on
its website narrative summaries of reasons for listing.2
0 3
Although the guidelines of the Libya Sanctions Committee for the
conduct of its work do not explicitly provide for such a procedure, the
Committee nevertheless provides such reasons on its website. The
guidelines for the conduct of the Committee's work also make
reference to 'reasons for listing available on the Committee's
website' .204 It is these reasons, which remain displayed on the
200. See Delisting Requests, UN (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/
en/sanctions/delisting/de-listing-request-stats (last visited Oct. 7, 2018) (providing
that the Security Council Committee received four requests for de-listing, two of
which are being processed although none of the individuals has been successfully
delisted to date).
201. S.C. Res. 2253, 15, 17 (expanding the individuals and entitles listed in
Resolutions 1267 and 1989 to include those associated with the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh)).
202. Clemens A. Feindiugle, UN Smart Sanctions and the UN Declaration on the
Rule of Law, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 113, 126
(Matthew Happold & Paul Eden eds., 2016).
203. S.C. Sanctions Comm., Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Its
Work, 9(a) (Dec. 23, 2016), https://ww.un.org/sc/suborg/enlsanctions/1267/
committee-guidelines.
204. S.C. Sanctions Comm., Provisional Guidelines of the Committee for the
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Committee's website at the time of this writing, it is argued in this
article, that these reasons are no longer valid with respect to the LIA.
In 2015, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2213 (2015), which reaffirmed
the sanctions against the LIA and other listed individuals and entities
as follows:
[T]hese measures also apply to individuals and entities determined by the
Committee to be engaging in or providing support for other acts that
threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct or undermine
the successful completion of its political transition, and decides that such
acts may include but are not limited to ... threatening or coercing Libyan
State financial institutions and the Libyan National Oil Company, or
engaging in any action that may lead to or result in the misappropriation of
Libyan state funds .... 2
0 5
This reasoning would provide a much clearer, and more accurate,
rationale for the LIA's continued listing by the Libya Sanctions
Committee.
Maintaining the LIA on the Sanctions List has had profound
implications for its returns on investments and has affected its
investments strategy. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes discussed the
(negative) "side effects" of U.N. sanctions, which she categorizes into
three groups of consequences: (i) political, (ii) humanitarian, and (iii)
economic . 206 She observes that these "side effects obviously affect the
target State ... but not necessarily in the manner in which they are
intended, ' 20 1 often causing the most serious harm to its civilian
population. These "side effects," particularly the economic ones, are
Conduct of Its Work, 5(g) (Oct. 25, 2011), https://www.un.org/sc/
suborg/en/sanctions/1970/guidelines ("The Secretariat shall, after publication but
within one week after a name is added to the List ... remind States receiving such
notification that they are required to take, in accordance with their domestic laws
and practices, all possible measures to notify or inform in a timely manner the newly
listed individuals and entities on the List of the measures imposed on them, any
information on reasons for listing available on the Committee's website as well as
all the information provided by the Secretariat in the above-mentioned
notification.") (emphasis added).
205. S.C. Res. 2213, 11(d) (Dec. 17, 2015).
206. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 53, at 57 (discussing debates within the
UN regarding the sanctions' compatibility "with rules of international human rights
law and humanitarian law").
207. Id. at 58.
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clearly visible with respect to Libya. Elaborating on the losses
experienced by the LIA in 2014 (that is, real losses of $721 million
and $1.6 billion to $2.3 billion in lost returns on investment), Mr.
Dabbashi observed as follows:
[T]he LIA has three main investment portfolios: equity investments, fixed
income investments and alternative investments. The LIA has no access to
its equity portfolio and, hence, cannot respond to market changes or
currency fluctuations, which erode the value of that portfolio further.
Moreover, most of the bonds the LIA had in its fixed income portfolio have
matured, and the proceeds are in frozen accounts, where they are earning
zero or negative interest rates. Also, the alternatives portfolio is
inaccessible to the LIA external managers, who still charge management
fees, even though they are not managing the funds. In fact, if the fund is
underperforming, the LIA is not able to close the fund or transfer it to
another manager. Thus, there is no incentive for financial institutions and
managers holding LIA funds to provide competitive interest rates or to
manage funds effectively.
20 8
Mr. Dabbashi therefore requested that the UNSC vary the sanctions
regime, permitting the LIA to: (i) transfer funds between accounts; (ii)
to open and close accounts; and (iii) to liquidate accounts and
(re)invest their funds, subject to three conditions:
(i) any transfer is to a frozen account that is in the same name as the
transferor; (ii) the transfer does not represent, directly or indirectly, a
transfer of any interest of the LIA to any other person subject to sanctions
under the Security Council; and (iii) the transfer is in accordance with the
applicable procedures of the Member State(s) which have jurisdiction over
the funds or other financial assets and economic resources.
20 9
Mr. Dabbashi was consequently not arguing that the LIA's assets
be unfrozen, but that the LIA be permitted to manage the assets,
subject to a number of safeguards. This was to avoid their dissipation
at the expense of the people of Libya, in whose name the LIA was
conceived.210 In other words, according to the March 21, 2016 Letter,
the U.N. sanctions regime constitutes an obstacle to the proper
208. Dabbashi, supra note 13, 5.
209. Id. 9.
210. Id. 10.
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governance of the Libyan SWF.21'
V. CONCLUSION
The LIA is the first SWF to have been subjected to UNSC sanctions.
This article analyzes the application of the UNSC sanctions to the LIA
by addressing a series of interrelated and complex issues. The
challenge has been made more difficult by the lack of transparency
that characterizes the existence and the activities of LIA, and by the
domestic political struggle that has led to a tripartite division in the
management of the SWF, which reflects the concentrations of power
in Libya.
First, the article analyzes the LIA's establishment, governance, and
investment strategy, examining the fund's initial engagement with
IFIs so as to improve its governance structure. But, more importantly,
the article highlights the problems that the LIA faces, posed by the
continued application of the U.N. sanctions almost seven years after
the death of Muammar Gaddafi, whose close association with the LIA
first led to its listing by the U.N. Sanctions Committee.
Our conclusions are two-fold but interrelated. Firstly, in relation to
the UNSC sanctions, the article highlights a potential problem with the
framing of the LIA asset freeze. One proposal put forward in this
article is that this association between the Gaddafi regime and the LIA
should no longer serve as the legal basis for the continued listing of
the LIA. The article identifies some of the reasons behind the
continued freezing of the LIA's assets, which include the contested
management of the SWF, and the risk of misappropriation of its assets
that could result if this situation is perpetuated, due to the fractured
nature of Libyan society. The ongoing asset freeze continues to
generate negative effects for the fund's management, which has
been-and remains-unable to react to market changes, address
currency fluctuations, and reinvest investments that have matured.
Because of the freeze, the LIA has lost opportunities to take advantage
of overall positive market conditions as other funds have done.212 This
211. See generally id.
212. By way of example, the Australian Future Fund, a member of the IFSWF,
has over the past 10 years had a return on its investments of 8.5 percent per year,
while its benchmark is set at 6.7 percent per year. See Portfolio Update at 31 March
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has, on the one hand, prevented the possible growth of the fund and,
on the other, caused losses to the fund.213 This means that the LIA is
unable to operate for the benefit of the Libyan people for whose
benefit the SWF was first established. Such application of the
sanctions has, in contrast, been to the detriment of the wealth of the
Libyan people.214 Considering the broader picture, the negative
economic consequences that the LIA is experiencing can serve as a
stepping-stone for rethinking the application of sanctions to SWFs. In
this regard, the UNSC might consider involving IFIs such as the IMF,
the World Bank Treasury (and possibly the IFSWF) in its freezing
procedures to ensure better management of frozen assets.
A related issue put forward in this article refers to the partial
relaxation of the U.N. sanctions against the LIA, which has enabled
the LIA to use new funds made available to it. This article has shown,
however, that the easing of asset freeze measures has failed to alleviate
the governance issues caused by its initial listing and the consequent
2018, FUTUREFUND (Apr. 23, 2018), http://www.futurefund.gov.au/news-
room/2018/04/23/00/21/portfolio-update-to-31-march-2018.
213. Against this view, one might argue that the UNSC sanctions are aimed at
preventing misappropriation and dissipation of the LIA's assets. However, we
believe that this position is weak, at least since the establishment of the GNA and its
Board of Trusties and Board of Directors, which not only have international support
but, more importantly, are the product of broader agreements between Libyan
political groups and factions. See New LIA Chief Wants UN to Introduce "Smart
Sanctions ", LIBYA HERALD (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.libyaherald.com/
2017/08/24/new-lia-chief-wants-un-to-introduce-smart-sanctions/; cf Lorenzo
Totaro & Boris Groendahl, EU Said to Agree to Freeze Libyan Fund, Central Bank
Assets, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2011, 12:23 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
product/blaw/document!LHRlN5 lAl14H?bc-W1 siU2VhcmNoIFJlc3VsdHMiLCI
vcHJvZHVjdC9ibGF3L3N1YXJjaC9ibGF3L3N1YXJjaC9yZXN1bHRzLzU5NDll
ZjIONjMxMjkxZDE3NjdmOTk3Y2U4YWRkMzVl1 d--3 ea6al 8a0e855a 1 e02cb3
2203ea6al 8a0e855al e02cb3220c0729878b40eddd3&headlineOnly-false&highlig
ht-EU+to+freeze+Libyan+sovereign+wealth+fund+assets.
214. See, e.g., PAUL SALEM & AMANDA KADLEC, LIBYA'S TROUBLED
TRANSITION 6 (June 2016), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/libya
transition.pdf (describing a $40 billion USD injection in 2011 that allowed the
government to finally resume payment to hundreds of thousands of its employees,
many of whom went unpaid once Libyan assets were frozen); Sophie Quinton, The
Quest for Libya's Frozen Assets, ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2011), www.theatlantic.com/
internationallarchive/2011/08/the-quest-for-libyas-frozenassets/244171 (providing
that Libya's Transitional National Council contended that it needed more than $5
billion USD to fund stabilization efforts immediately).
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freezing of the majority of the assets under its control. A final point in
this regard is a suggestion to the LIA to continue legally challenging
the freezing of its assets in specific States. While litigation might seem
cumbersome, it would enable the LIA to regain access to assets that
might be used by the fund and has already had success in the Italian
courts and, albeit to a lesser extent and in a different fashion, in the
U.K. High Court.
Second, in relation to the LIA's governance, management, and
investment strategy, the article proposes that making funds available
to the GNA-appointed LIA executives, who already enjoy U.N.
support, would enable the LIA to use and better administer its funds.
Such measures would prevent future possible losses of value in the
LIA's assets being caused by the UNSC measures. This would not
only benefit the LIA but would also serve to increase the legitimacy
of the GNA, which should have sole and effective oversight over the
LIA. More importantly, regaining control of the frozen assets would
enable the LIA to better manage them in pursuit of the objectives
enshrined in its constituent law. A prerequisite to the better
management of the LIA's assets by its new Board is finding a solution
to its past governance problems. Such difficulties were exacerbated by
political interference and divisions, which led to a weak and confused
management that overlooked adherence to the Santiago Principles and
ignored the LIA's membership in the IFSWF. To address these
longstanding problems, the LIA needs to increase its collaboration
with IFIs, such as the IMF and the World Bank Treasury, and to
improve its governance by complying with the Santiago Principles,
which we anticipate will eventually reduce political influence on its
management.
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